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CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD
PERSON IN PENNSYLVANIA
A contract in which the promisor (A) engages to the
promisee (B) to render some performance to a third person
(X) raises a question which has never been free from doubt
and confusion. Can a third person (X) sue on a contract
made for his benefit? The courts of England, after some
vacillation, definitely decided this question in the negative,
principally on the ground that the third person (X) is not in
privity of contract. Since the promise is not made to him
and he does not furnish the consideration, he is a stranger
to the contract and can maintain no action upon it.

"Dunlop vs. Selfridge, (1915) A. C. 847, 853; see, for good statement of English law, Corbin's Anson on Contract, P, 330; 1 Williston on Contracts, p. 685.
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On the other hand, the American courts, by the great
weight of authority, permit a third person to sue on a contract made for his benefit,2 and this conclusion is reached, in
spite of the lack of "privity," for the simple and commonsense reason that it carries out the intention of the parties.
An examination of the Pennsylvania cases will not at
once reveal a satisfactorily and consistently definite principle in this state, and it therefore seems justifiable to review
in detail the leading cases and to evolve, if possible, the
principles which guide the courts in Pennsylvania to a solution of this specific problem: Can a third person sue on a
contract made for his benefit? The Supreme Court itself
has made many conflicting statements. For example, in Edmundson vs. Penny,3 the court, per Gibson, C. J., said, "Whatever may be the conflict of opinion in the earlier cases, it is
now settled that a parol promise to one for the benefit of another, can support an action on it only by him from whom
the consideration moved, or who was the meritorious cause
of it." On the other hand, the court said in Merriman vs.
Moore,' "It is a rudimental principle, that a party may sue on
a promise made on sufficient consideration for his use and
benefit though it be made to another and not to himself;'5
and in Hind vs. Holdship,6 "He for whose benefit a contract
is made may maintain an action upon it, although no consideration pass from him to the defendant, nor any promise
from the defendant directly to the plaintiff." The very evident conflict in the decisions the court sought to explain m1
Kountz vs. Holthouse7 by saying that though the cases are
not in entire harmony, their difference is more apparent thal.
real and that the apparent conflict arises from the applicatiot.
213 C. J. 705, sec. 815, et seq; 6 R. C. L. 884, n. 12. This rule
is statutory in Cal., Idaho, Mont., N. Dak., S. Dak., Va., W. Va., Ga.,
and N. J.
31 Pa. 334.
490 Pa. 78.
5The court made the same statement in Lowery vs. Hensal's
Heirs. 28 Pa. 572.
62 Watts 104; see also Beers vs. Robinson, 9 Pa. 229.

785 Pa. 235.
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of one rule of law to different statements of fact. Again, in
Howes vs. Scott,8 the court thought the question free from
doubt when it said, "At common law no one, could maintain
an action upon a contract to which he was not a party. There
are, however, exceptions to the rule which, in this state, are as
well settled as the rule itself." A close scrutiny of the cases
on the question would not cause the reader to consider the
problem so entirely free from difficulty.

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSON OTHER THAN CONTRACTUAL DISTINGUISHED
a. Property Rights
The problem here presented is whether A and B by their
contract can confer contractual rights upon a third person,
X, so that he can sue on the contract in his own name,
though not a party to it. There must be distinguished other
situations in which a third person acquires, from a contract
to which he is not a party, rights other than contractual,
which are recognized and enforced even in England and
other jurisdictions which do not permit a third person to
sue on a contract made for his benefit.
X, a third person, may acquire property rights from
the contract of A and B. For example, the contract between
a sdller of goods and the carrier may result in the passage
of title to the buyer. The buyer's property right will be
recognized although it arises from a contract to which he
was not a party. To enforce his right he does not sue upon
the contract.
Again, the third person may be a cestui que trust.
Whenever property is delivered to one person under such
circumstances that the legal title passes to him, but he undertakes or is under a duty to deliver that specific property
or its proceeds to a third person or use the property for the
latter's benefit, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust
8224 Pa. 7. 10.
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arises.9 The third person may compel the trustee to perform and equity was never deterred from giving relief because the third person, the cestui, was not in privity of contract. Sometimes the cestui, in the case of money, may compel the trustee to deliver it to him in an action for money
had and received. Accordingly some courts have held that
a third person can sue on a contract made for his benefit
only when the contracting parties had created an actual
trust. 10 That is, the third person would acquire a contractual right by reason of the magic presence of a trust. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has likewise intimated that
a third person can sue on a contract made for his benefit
only when an actual trust in his favor was created. The
court has said, "If one deliver money or property to another under the promise of the latter to deliver it over to a
third person who has a beneficial interest therein, or to convert it into money and pay him the proceeds, the third person can maintain an action therefor against the promisor!""
The court cited for authority two earlier cases, 1 2 neither of
which made any such statement. But, as pointed out by
Prof. Williston 13 and as will be shown infra, the Pennsylvania courts have often permitted a third person to sue
where-no trust existed. If an actual trust exists, the third
person or cestui can enforce his property rights without su.
ing on any contract made for his benefit. If, in addition to
the ordinary remedies, a cestui que trust may also sue on
the contract which, in the particular case, created the trust,
9Forbes vs. Thorpe. 209 Mass. 570.
lOBorden vs. Boardman, 157 Mass. 410; but see Forbes vs.
Thorpe, supra, n. 9.
"Wynn vs. Wood, 97 Pa. 216; Grim vs. Thomas Iron Co., 115
Pa. 611.
12Hinds vs. Holdship, 2 Watts 104; Beers vs. Robinson, 9 Pa. 229.
'.31 Williston on Contracts, p. 697, n. 79; and see, id, p. 676 and
p. 678, n., where Prof. Williston points out that the apparent present Pennsylvania rule permitting a third person to sue on a contract
made for his benefit is a relic of the early common law, prior to the
introduction of assumpsit, when a third person was allowed to enforce a claim in debt or account although there existed no actual
trust.
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it must be on the theory that to permit him to sue carries out
the intention of the parties. It would follow, therefore, that
any third person for whose benefit a contract is made should
be permitted to sue, whether there was any trust or not.
b. Agency
Care must be taken to distinguish some principles of
the law of agency from those govening the right of a third
person to sue on a contract made for his benefit. It is familiar law that if B, in contracting with A, either is or
assumes to be the agent of X, the latter may sue upon the
contract. The right of a third person benefited by a contract to sue upon it has sometimes been defended on the
ground that B, the promisee, in contracting with A, thL
promisor, for the benefit of X, was the agent of X.' 4 But
the existence of an agency is a question of fact. It cannot
be conveniently assumed that the promisee was an agent for
the third person simply for the purpose of permitting the
third person to sue upon the contract of A and B, when in
fact there was no agency.
c. Novation
Novations and offers of novation must also be distinguished from the right of a third person to sue on a contract made for his benefit. If A and B make a contract
whereby A promises B that A will pay to X a debt owed by
B to X, the only question is whether X can sue on a promise
made by A to B, and no novation is involved. The aim of a
novation would be to substitute for the old obligation of B
to X a new obligation of A to X. To work a novation, it is
not enough that a promise has been made by A to the original debtor, B, to pay the latter's debt; nor does the assent
of the creditor, X, help the matter unless an offer was made
to him. The theory of a novation is that the new debtor, A,
contracts with the old debtor, B, that he will pay the latter's
14Fnr example see Lawrence vs. Fox, 20 N. T.

268.
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debt to X, and also to the same effect with the creditor, X,
who agrees to accept the new debtor for the old. A novation
is not made out simply by showing that the substituted
debtor, A, agreed to pay B's debt. It must appear that he
agreed with the creditor, X, to do so. Morever, this agreement must be based on the consideration of the creditor's
agreement to look to the new debtor instead of the old. The
creditor's assent to hold the new debtor liable is therefore
immaterial unless there is assent to give up the original
debtor. 15
It has been suggested that the right of a third person
to sue on a contract made for his benefit is based on no.
vation;16 that the agreement between the promisor, A, and
the promisee, B, operates as an offer of a novation to the
beneficiary, X. But in the case supposed above, the parties
contemplate no such offer and the beneficiary, X, has no
reason to believe that in taking advantage of A's promise he
is extinguishing his previous rights against B. If such an
offer is in fact made to X and accepted by him, there is a
novation and a third person's right to sue on a contract is not
involved. Where a novation is thus effected, there is a new
contract between A and X, and the latter is not a third person for whose benefit a contract has been made, a beneficiary of a contract between other persons. Instead, X is a
promisee and has given consideration by discharging the
previous debtor, B.
. Suppose that, where A and B make a contract whereby
A promises to pay X, the latter is not a creditor of B, the
promisee. X has no rights to discharge and clearly there15As to the nature and elements of novation, see Prof. Ames' ai.
ticle in 6 Harv. L. R. 184; Commonwealth vs. National Surety Co.,
253 Pa. 5; Jones vs. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 255 Pa. 566, 573,
where the court said, "The essentials of a novation are the displacement and extinction of a former contract, the substitution of a new
agreement, a sufficient consideration therefore, and the consent of the
parties thereto * * * * and the mere acceptance of the obligation of a
third person (A) will be considered as additional security."
I6 See suggestion of this theory and objections thereto in Corbin s
Anson on Contract, 3. 347.
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fore X's right to sue A is not based on novation. It would
seem that where a third person, a creditor of the promisee,
is permitted to sue on a contract made for his benefit, his
right to do so is not based on any theory of novation but
17
is to be regarded as additional security.
d. The Beneficiary a Promisee
Promises for the benefit of a third person must also be
distinguished from promises to one who has not given the
consideration for the promise. If A makes a promise to X
supported by consideration moving from B, the plaintiff,
X, is not a third person for whose benefit a contract has been
made. He is a promisee and there is no lack of "privity.
The problem is merely one as to consideration. It is the,
English law that the consideration must move from the promisee. 18 But the American courts permit the plaintiff to sue
on a promise made to himself although the consideration
The same result would be
was furnished by another.'
reached where A's promise is made to both B and X, although the consideration is furnished by B alone.
Where X is not himself a promisee, he can always establish a sufficient "privity" to satisfy the courts by obtaining an assignment from the promisee, B. X will then possess whatever rights the promisee had as well as such rights
as he may have as a third person for whose benefit a contract has been made.
TWO TYPES OF THIRD PERSON BENEFICIARIES
The third person, X, for whose benefit a contract may be
made by A and B, may be either a donee-beneficiary or a
creditor-beneficiary. Although these terms are used large17See note 15, supra.
lSDunlop vs. Selfridge, (1915) A. C. 847.
19This was apparently the situation in Wynn vs. Wood, 97 Pa.
216, and Freed vs. Richey, 115 Pa. 361. See also cases cited in 1
Williston on Contracts, p. 236, n. 59. A third person who furnishes
the consideration may sue on a contract made for his benefit, b

R. C. L. 883, n. 6.
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ly for convenience, an understanding of them is essential to
any discussion of the right of a third person to sue on a
contract for his benefit.
Where the purpose of B in securing from A a promise for
the benefit of X is to confer a gratuitous benefit upon X,
the latter is a donee-beneficiary. He is usually the only person who will be benefited by the promised performance.
Performance will not benefit 13, the promisee; he is to receive nothing, and performance by A will not discharge any
duty owned by B to X, for none is owed.
On the other hand, the third person, X, may be a creditor or obligee of B, the promisee, and the purpose of B in
securing the promise of A to pay to or do something for X
is to thus indirectly discharge the obligation which he (B)
owes X. In such a situation, X is a creditor-beneficiary."
Where X is a donee-beneficiary, inasmuch as B has no
pecuniary interest in performance by A and his only purpose could have been the conferring of a benefit upon X, the
latter should be permitted to sue, because clearly the contract was made for his benefit. To permit him to sue carries out the intention of the parties, and the fetish of "lack
of privity" should not defeat his recovery. The great weight
of American authority permits a donee-beneficiary to sue
on a contract made for his benefit.20 In life insurance the
beneficiary is usually a donee-beneficiary, and in all juris21
dictions he can maintain suit on the policy.
It was once suggested by the Supreme Court of the
United States 22 that a donee-beneficiary was the only kind
who could sue, on the ground that to allow a creditor-beneficiary to sue would subject the promisor, A, to two suits for
breach,2 3 one by the beneficiary and the other by the prom2
OSee cases cited in 13 C. J. 705, see. 815; 1 Williston on Contracts, p. 694, n. 70. England is contra, supra, note 1.
211 Williston on Contracts, p. 699, see. 369, and cases cited.
22
National Bank vs. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123.
22This reason was suggested as defeating the right of a creditorbeneficiary to sue In Guthrie vs.Kerr, 85 'Pa. 303, 308; Blymlre vs.
Boistle, 6 Watts 182; Adams vs. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 85.
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isee who would be damaged by A's non-performance inasmuch as his (B's) obligation to X would not be discharged.
On the other hand, it is 'to be noted that in New York, on
the authority of the celebrated case of Lawrence vs. Fox,24
a beneficiary cannot sue unless he is a creditor or obligee of
the promisee, and cases permitting a donee-beneficiary to
sue are exceptions to a general rule to the contrary.2 5 It has
also been suggested that a creditor-beneficiary should not
be permitted to sue, because the purpose of the promisee,
B, in securing the promise from A was primarily to secure an
advantage for himself, the discharge of the obligation owed
by B to X; B was considering his own welfare and was not
intending any benefit to X, other than that which might incidentally result; the contract was not made for the.benefit
of the promisee's creditor.26 But in spite of these objections, the great majority of American courts permit a creditor-beneficiary to sue.2
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES
It is now purposed to examine and review the leading
cases in Pennsylvania to determine when the courts in this
state permit donee-beneficiaries and creditor-beneficiaries
to sue. The earlier cases are in great confusion and their
results are far from consistent. The first case of any importance was Hind vs. Holdship, 25 where B assigned property to A who promised to pay B's creditors. One of the
creditors, X, was permitted to sue A, the court saying, "He
for whose benefit a contract is made may maintain an action upon it, though no consideration pass from him to the
defendant, nor any promise from the defendant directly to
2420 N. Y. 268.
25For an excellent statement of the law in New York, see Seaver
224 N. Y. 233.
vs. Ransom,
26
See 1 Williston on Contracts, p. 711. But Prof. Williston believes
that a donee-beneficiary should be permitted to sue, id, p. 683.
27
See cases cited in 13 C. J. 705, sec. 815; 1 Williston on Contracts,
p. 712. n. 27.
282 Watts 104.
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the plaintiff." Although the plaintiff was a creditor-beneficiary, the court held broadly that any third person could sue
on a contract made for his benefit.
Shortly thereafter the case of Blymire vs. Boistle 29 was
decided. B conveyed a lot to A, who promised to pay B's debt
to X, the plaintiff, who was thus a creditor-beneficiary. The
court held that X could not sue A. This case has been cited
so often that it is justifiable to quote from the opinion:
"Where one person contracts with another to pay money to
a third, or to deliver over some valuable thing; and such
person is thus the only part in interest, he ought to possess
the right to release the demand, or recover it by action. But
where a debt already exists from one person to another, a
promise by a third person to pay such debt, being for the
benefit of the original debtor, and to relieve him from the
payment of it, he ought to have a right of action against the
promisor for his own indemnity; and if the promisor were
also liable to the original creditor, he would be subject to
two separate actions at the same time, for the same debt,
which would be inconvenient, and might lead to injustice."
From this it would appear that a donee-beneficiary can sue,
but that a creditor-beneficiary cannot.
In Edmunason vs. Penny,30 the plaintiff, a donee-beneficiary, was not permitted to sue, the court flatly denying
the right of any third person to sue on a contract made for
his benefit. The court did not discuss the two cases mentioned above. Several cases were decided thereafter in
which the court held that a creditor-beneficiary could not
sue.3 Many of these cases relied on Blymire vs. Boistie.
It is important to notice that in none of these was the consideration for the promise, money or property placed in the
hands of the promisor by the promisee at the time of the
296 Watts 182, followed in Beckey vs. Morrison, 6 Watts 349.
301 Pa. 334; see note 3, supra.
3'Ramsdale vs. Horton, 3 Pa. 330; Campbell vs. Lacock, 40 Pa.
448; Robertson vs. Reed, 47 Pa. 115; Torrens vs. Campbell, 74 Pa. 470;
Kountz vs. Holthouse, 85 Pa. 235; Guthrie vs. Kerr, 85 Pa. 303.
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promise. At the same time, however, other cases were decided, may of them on the authority of Hind vs. Holdship,
3
holding that donee-beneficiaries 32 and creditor-beneficiaries 3
could sue. Again, in view of later discussion, it is important
to notice that in all these cases the consideration for the
promise was money or property put into the hands of the
promisor by the promisee at the time of the promise, and in
some of the cases a trust may be said to have been created.
As a matter of fact, the court intimated in two cases that
a third person can sue on a contract made for his benefit
3 4
only when an actual trust in his favor had been created.
This was the state of the law on the question when the
court decided the case of Adams vs. Kuehn,35 regarded by
many of the later cases as the leading authority on the right
of a third person to sue on a contract made for his benefit.
In that case Weaver was indebted to both the defendant
Adams and the plaintiff Kuehn. In consideration of Weaver confessing judgment in favor of Adams for $25,000,
Adams promised Weaver to pay the latter's debt to the
plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff, a creditor-beneficiary, could not sue. The court said that the general rule
in all jurisdictions was that a third person could not sue on
a contract to which he was not a party, but that there were
exceptions to the rule based on the nature of the consideration for the promise. Again, the case is so important that
a portion of the opinion of Judge Williams may be quoted:
"Where one person enters into a contract with another to pay
money to a third, or to deliver some valuable thing, and
such third party is the only party interested in the payment
32 Ayre's Appeal, 28 Pa. 179; Hostetter vs. Hollinger, 117 'Pa. 606.
33Beers vs. Robinson, 9 Pa. 229; Vincent ys. Watson, 18 Pa. 96,
where buyer of business who had agreed to pay his vendor's debts
was held liable to a creditor of the latter; Bellas vs. Fagely, 19 Pa.
273; Townsend vs. Long, 77 Pa. 143; White vs. Thlelens, 160 Pa. 173.
In the three latter cases the defendant-partner promised retiring
partners to pay firm debts and a firm creditor was permitted to sue.
34
See supra, notes 11, 12. 13 and text.
36119 Pa. 76 (1888).
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or delivery, he can release the promisor from performance
or compel performance by suit."3 6
"If, on the other hand, a debt already exists from one
person to another, a promise by a third person to pay such
debt is for the benefit of original debtor to whom it is made,
and can only be released or enforced by him. If it could also
be enforced by the original creditor, the promisor would be
liable to two actions for the same debt at the same time ana
on the same contract.37 Among the exceptions, are cases
where the promise to pay the debt (of the promisee) rests
upon the fact that money or property is placed in the iands
of the promisor for that particular purpose. 8 Also where
one buys out the stock of a tradesman and undertakes tn
take the place, fill the contracts, and pay the debts o his
vendor.3 9 These cases as well as the case of one who receives money or property on the promise to pay or deliver
to a third person, 40 are cases in which the third person, although not a party to the contract, may be fairly said to
be a party to the consideration on which it rests. In good
conscience the title to the money or thing which is the consideration of the promise passes to the beneficiary, and the
promisor is turned in effect to a trustee. But when the
promise is made to, and in relief of one to whom the promise
36
From this it would appear that a donee-beneficiary can sue.
This portion of the statement quoted is almost identical with that
cuoted from BlymIre vs. Boistle.
37
Subjecting the promisor to more than one suit (perhaps many)
does not deter the court, under the exceptions next stated, from permitting creditors of the promisee to sue.
3
80f this exception, Prof. Williston says, "The first exception
thus stated is that of a trust, but in its application of the rule the
Pennsylvania court has gone beyond trusts properly so called." 1
Williston on Contracts, p. 717, n. The facts in Hinds vs. Holdship, 2
Watts 104, and Beers vs. Robinson, 9 Pa. 229, bring those cases within
this exception.
39
See cases cited in note 33, illustrative of this exception.
401t is submitted that this statement is a garbled repetition of
the rule relating to donee-beneficiaries laid down in the preceding
paragraph quoted from the opinion, and is largely responsible for
the rule, stated later, which Prof. Williston says subsequent cases
applied to creditor-beneficiaries In following Adams vs. Kuehn.
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is made, upon a consideration moving from him, no particular fund or means of payment being placed in the hands
of the promisor out of which the payment is to be made, there
is no trust arising in the promisor and no title passing to the
third person. The beneficiary is not the original creditor
who is a stranger to the contract and the consideration, but
the original debtor who is a party to both, and the right of
action is in him alone."4 1
From the preceding paragraph, quoted from Adams vs.
;(uehn, it would appear that the court decided that a creditor-beneficiary could sue on a contract to which he was not
a party, when there was created by that contract a trust in
his favor. But, as pointed out by Prof. Williston, later cases
in following Adams vs. Kuehn have gone beyond a trust'theory properly so called, and have permitted a creditor-beneficiary to sue where the consideration for A's promise to B
was money or property placed in A's hands by B at the time
of the promise, although the promisor was under no obligation to use the property or its proceeds for the purpose of
paying the creditor-beneficiary in performance of his promise.
For example, in Delp vs. Brewing Co., 42 the defendant
purchased B's hotel and furnishings and promised B, as part
of the consideration, to pay B's debts. A creditor of B was
permitted to sue A. The plaintiff was a creditor-beneficiary
and the court said he might be regarded, under Adams vs.
Kuehn, as a party to the consideration. It is to be noted
that the consideration for A's promise was property transferred to him at the time of the promise although he was
not to use that property to pay the plaintiff and other cred4'This paragraph has been frequently quoted with approval by

later cases.

See especially Howes vs. Scott, 224 Pa. 7; Sweeney vs.

Houston, 243 Pa. 542, 546; M. E. Church vs. Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221;
Edmundson's Estate, 259 Pa. 429.

4-123 Pa. 42.

Other cases, on similar facts, have held that a

creditor-beneficiary could sue, Pittsburgh Carbon Co., vs. Phila. Co.,
130 Pa. 438; Sargent vs. Johns, 203 Pa. 386; Cox vs. Phila. Pottery Co.,
214 Pa. 373; Howes vs. Scott, 224 Pa. 7; Bruce vs. Howley, 29 Super.
169; C. Keynon Co., vs. Sutton, 50 Super. 445.
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itors. The court itself said that whether a technical trust
was created was immaterial.
In Freeman vs. Penna. R. R.,'-' the facts were apparently
the same as in Delp vs. Brewing Co. The defendant leased
another road, promising to pay the lessor's indebtedness on
mortgage bond coupons. The court, however, held that the
plaintiff, one of the holders of the coupons and thus a creditor-beneficiary, could not sue on the promise. The ctcision is inconsistent with the Delp case, but the court purported to follow Adams vs. Kuehn and practically held that
a donee- beneficiary could sue and that a creditor-beneficiary could not sue. But the court failed to observe or mention the exceptions stated in the opinion of Adams vs Kuehn,
quoted above.
In another case 44 the defendant bought A's interest in
a partnership and promised to pay firm debts for which B
was liable. A creditor of the firm was not permitted to sue.
The court distinguished Delp vs. Brewing Co., pointing out
that no property or assets were put into the promisor's hands
as consideration for his promise as in the Delp' case. For
similar reasons, the plaintiff, a creditor-beneficiary, was denied recovery in M. E. Church vs. Isenberg.45
46
The following statement appeared in a recent case
where the plaintiff was a creditor-beneficiary: "Although,
as a general rule, most jurisdictions, including our own, recognize the doctrine that a third person may maintain an action on a promise made for his benefit, yet this doctrine is
limited to cases where the third person is either a party to
the consideration, or the contract created in him a legal or47
equitable interest entitling him to compel performance."
43173 Pa. 274.
44 Sweeney vs. Houston, 243 Pa. 542, followed in Tasin vs. Bastress, 268 Pa. 85.
45246 'Pa. 221.
4
6Klingler vs. Wisk, 266 Pa. 1, 5.
47This same statement was made in Wray vs. Bowman, 74 Super.
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This was an apparent effort to return to the principles stated in Adams vs. Kuehn.
Since Adams vs. Kuehn several cases have been decided
in which the plaintiff was a donee-beneficiary and in all of
them, as in similar cases decided before Adams vs. Kuehn,
the donee-beneficiary was permitted to sue. 48 In one of
the leading cases of this group, Edmundson's Estate, the
plaintiff's mother conveyed real estate to the decedent, who
promised to pay to the plaintiff an amount equal to that
invested in the land by plaintiff's father. The plaintiff's
claim, resting on a right to sue on the promise, was allowed,
the court stating that the plaintiff was the only party beneficially interested and could enforce the decedent's contract
even though the plaintiff had no beneficial interest in the
property. The court followed the first paragraph quoted
above from Adams vs. Kuehn and approved the case of
Hoffa vs. Hoffa. 4' In the latter case, B conveyed a farm to
his brother A, who promised to pay to the plaintiffs, another
brother and sister, $1000 each. The plaintiffs, donee-beneficiaries, were permitted to sue. Cases in which a donee-beneficiary has been denied the right to sue are infrequent. In one
case"0 the defendant; sole heir of an estate, in consideration
of B assisting in the administration of the estate, promised
to give B's sister, the plaintiff, a share of the estate. It was
held that the plaintiff could not enforce the agreement on
the ground that no trust had been created and no fund or
property had been but into the promisor's hands at the time
of the promise. This was an attempt to apply to a doneebeneficiary principles which Adams vs. Kuehn held applicable only to creditor-beneficiaries.
48Edmundson's Estate, 259 Pa. 429; McBride vs. Paper Co., 263
Pa. 345; Hoffa vs. Hoffa, 38 Super. 356; Wray vs. Bowman, 74 Super.

479; Depuy vs. Loomis, 74 Super 497.
49

Supra, note 48.
Mallalleu's Estate, 42 Super. 101. The only other decision found
which does not permit a donee-beneficiary to sue is Edmundson vs.
Penny, 1 Pa. 334.
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A decision of the Supreme Court has been reported sinc.
the writer started this article, in which, although the plaintiff was a donee-beneficiary, the court makes statements applicable as well to creditor-beneficiaries and the decision enunciates a rule governing the right of a third person to sue
on a contract made for his benefit which practically removes
the pre-existing doubt and confusion on the question. In
this recent case, Brill vs. Brill, 5' the defendant who was the
putative father of an illegitimate child executed a bond to the
child's mother as obligee, conditioned on the payment of
monthly sums, in part for the benefit of the obligee and in
stated sums for the benefit of the child. It was held that
the child could sue the defendant on the bond, and this, even
though the defendant had been released and discharged b),
the obligee from making further payments to her. The Supreme Court adopted the excellent opinion of the learned
court below, which instead of citing and relying upon the
multitude of cases on the question, merely quoted from Blymire vs. Boistle, called by the court the leading case in this
state, and from Klingler vs. Wick, the statements which are
quoted previously herein. 52 In referring to the statement
from Blymire vs. Boistle, the court said:
"This statement is quoted with approval in numerous subsequent cases, and seems to amount in principle
to this: That, if the promise be to pay money to a thire
person, but it is made for the benefit and in relief of the
other party to the agreement, the third person obtains
no rights under the contract. If, on the other hand, the
promise to pay to the third person is not for the benefit
primarily of the other party to the contract, but for that
of the third person himself, the latter has a legal or equitable interest in the contract which enables him to enforce rights thereunder, even though he himself was not
a party to the consideration paid to the promisor * * * *
51282 Pa. 276, 127 At. 840 (1925).
52
See supra, notes 29 and 46 and text.
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The test of the third person's right of action seems to
depend upon the question as to whether the promise is
made primarily for the benefit of the other party to the
contract or of the third person, that is to say, whethei
the payment is in relief of the promisee and the fact
that the money is to be paid to the third person is merely a matter of arrangement or convenience for the other
party to the contract, or whether the primary purpose
and object of the promise are to benefit the third person.
Of course, this distinction cannot exist in an absolute
sense, because in every case, there is presumably some
benefit accruing to the promisee, or else the contract
would not have been so made, and, on the other hand,
there is also presumably some benefit accruing to the
third person, by virtue of the fact that he is to be tM

recipient of the payment. But while, therefore, both
the promisee and the third person no doubt receive some
benefit in every such contract, the determining question
subserved
is, whose benefit and interest are primarily
53
purpose."
paramount
of
matter
a
as
and
Further, in referring to the statement from Klingler
vs. Wick and apparently referring to earlier cases stating
that a creditor-beneficiary could sue where he was a party
to the consideration, i. e., where the promisor received
funds or property as consideration for his promise, the
court said:
"It further appears from the general tenor of the
authorities that the question as to whether or not the
third person is a party to the consideration is not a conclusive factor. The consideration may be wholly paia
by the promisee, and yet the third person may be the
53This statement, it is submitted, is simply a repetition of what
the court intended in the first important case on the question, Hinds
vs. Holdship, 2 Watts 104, where it was said, "He for whose benefit
a contract is made may maintain an action upon it, although no consideration pass from him to the defendant, nor any promise from
the defendant directly to the plaintiff."
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one for whose benefit the promise is primarily made,
and in such case the third person has a right of action."
Despite previous decisions, Brill vs. Brill lays down the
rule that a third person, whether a donee-beneficiary or
creditor-beneficiary, may sue on a contract to which he is not
a party where it was made for the primary purpose of subserving his interest and benefit. Of course, the plaintiff was
a donee-beneficiary and future cases may hold that Brill vs.
Brill must be limited to its facts and that it therefore decides
what the court has consistently held, that a donee-beneficiary
may sue. But Brill vs. Brill draws no distinction between
donee and creditor-beneficiaries and the decision should be
welcomed and followed as finally statina an understandable,
workable and common-sense rule governing the right of a third
person to sue on a contract, a rule which is in accord with the
weight of American authority.
Brill vs. Brill is revolutionary in another respect. It
has been the law in Pennsylvania that a third person could
not sue on a contract made for his benefit where the contract
was under seal, 54 on the ground that to permit him to u.
so would permit an action on a sealed instrument in assumpsit where the proper remedy should be covenant. Brill vs.
Brill points out that this reason is a technicality dependent
upon old rules of pleading which no longer exist and holds
that where a third person would otherwise be permitted to
sue he is not to be refused a remedy because the contract upon
which he seeks to sue is under seal.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT BENEFICIARIES
In order that a third person may sue on a contract made
by others it ought to appear that the contract was made for
the purpose and with the intention that it benefit him. In
other words, he must be a direct beneficiary and not one in54 Stroheeker vs. Grant, 16 S. & R. 237; DeBoile vs. Penna. Ins.
Co., 4 Whart. 68; Miss. R. R. Co., vs. Southern R. R., 8 Phila. 107.
For cases in other states see 13 C. J. 711, sec. 818; 6 R. C. L. 885,
sec. 272.
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directly benefitted by a contract made primarily for some
other purpose. In the case of a donee-beneficiary the difficulty does not exist, but in the case of a creditor-beneficiary
it is always an important question as to whether he was a direct beneficiary and much of the apparent conflict in decisions can be explained on this ground. Several cases have
denied recovery to a creditor-beneficiary because he was not
a direct beneficiary. 55 This question often arises where a
contractor gives a bond, conditioned, among other things,
on the payment of subcontractors, materialmen, workmen,
etc. Sometimes it is held that the latter are direct beneficiaries and may sue on the bond, 56 and again that they cannot sue because the bond was given simply to protect the
obligee. 57 As a matter of fact the whole question of the
right of a third person to sue should depend simply on the
question as to whether the contract was made to benefit him,
i. e., whether he was a direct beneficiary, and it is this test
or criterion that Brill vs. Brill seems to supply.
MORTGAGE-BENEFICIARIES: Act 12 June 1878, P. L. 205
One of the most frequent cases where a third party seeks
to sue on a contract as its beneficiary is that of a mortgagee.
A mortgagee is always the creditor of somebody, but he may
not be the creditor of the promisee. Where a mortgagor, himself personally liable for the mortgage debt, sells the mortgaged premises to a grantee who assumes and agrees to pay
the mortgage debt, the mortgagee is a creditor-beneficiary,
and he is almost universally allowed to sue the grantee for the
5
Although the Pennsylvania courts
amount of the debt
have experienced some difficulty in permitting other creditorbeneficiaries to sue, they are not deterred on that account
55Morgan Engineering Co., vs. MeKee, 155 Pa. 51; Klingler vs.
Wick. 266 Pa. 1; Cooper vs. Walther, 44 Super. 298; Blue Valley Slate
Co., vs. Yeager, 78 Super 533.
56Phila. vs. Stewart, 198 Pa. 422; Commonwealth vs. Surety Co.,
253 Pa. 5.
57M. E. Church vs. Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221; Lancaster vs. Frescoln,
203 Pa. 640.
•sSee cases cited In 1 Williston on Contracts, p. 720, n; 13 C. J.

708, n. 12.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

from giving the mortgagee the right to sue a grantee who
assumes the mortgage debt.59 But suppose the mortgagor
sells the land subject to the mortgage to a grantee who makes
no promise to pay the mortgage debt. Such a grantee is
not liable to the mortgagee.60 But suppose such a grantee
sells the land to a second who does assume and agree to pay
the mortgage debt. The first grantee as promisee, not being
personally liable, will not be benefitted by the payment to
the mortgagee who is therefore, a donee-beneficiary, so far
as the promise of the second grantee is concerned. The
courts in this state permit the mortgagee to sue a second
grantee under such circumstances,6 1 although the decisions
62
inother states are in hopeless conflict.
In considering the right of a mortgagee to sue a grantee
of land for the mortgage debt, as well as the rights and duties and liabilities of the grantor and grantee, it is necessary
in Pennsylvania to note and examine the effect of Act 12
June 1878, P. L. 205,63 which provides as follows:
"Section 1. Grantees of real estate which is subject to ground-rent, or bound by mortgage or other encumbrance, shall not be personally liable for the pay-.
ment of such ground-rent, mortgage or other encumbrance, unless he shall, by agreement in writing, have
expressly assumed a personal liability therefor, or there
shall be express words in the deed of conveyance, stating
that the grant is made on condition of the grantee assuming such personal liability; Provided, that the use of the
words "under and subject to the payment of such groundrent, mortgage or other encumbrance" shall not alone be
so construed as to make such grantee personally liable
as aforesaid.
59

See especially Lowery vs. Hensal's Heirs, 281 Pa. 572; Gill's Estate, 268 Pa. 500; Old Colony Trust Co., vs. Transit Co., 192 'Pa. 596;
Merriman vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa. 200.
6
OFisler vs. Reach, 202 Pa. 74; Lennig's Estate, 52 Pa. 135.
61
Merriman vs. Moore. 90 Pa. 7R: Gill's Estate, 268 Pa- 500, 502.
62See cases cited in I Williston on Contracts, p. 728, n. 71.
631920 Statutes. sec. 18854; 4 Purd, 4044. The title of the Act
has been held properly comprehensive and the Act constitutional in
Sloan vs. Klein, 230 Pa. 132.
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Section 2. The right to enforce such personal liability shall not inure to any person other than the person
with whom such an agreement is made, nor shall such
personal liability continue, after the said grantee has
bona fide parted with the encumbered property, unless
he shall have expressly assumed such continuing liability."
Before the Act it had been held where the mortgagor
conveyed the uremises "under and subject to" the mortgage,
that those words created a covenant of indemnity on the part
of the grantee, 64 i. e., the purchase price had been diminished
by the amount of the mortgage debt and if the grantor-mortgagor were compelled to pay it, the grantee must under his
covenant of indemnity reimburse the grantor, and this right
the grantor could enforce against the grantee personally,
or by being subrogated to the mortgagee's right of foreclosure.
It was also held that where the grantee simply took "undei
and subject to" the mortgage, he did not ispo facto by the
use of those words become personally liable- to the mortgagee.1' But if by other words, the grantee in substance
"assumed and agreed to pay" the mortgage debt, he was
personally liable to the mortgagee who could sue him on his
promise, " and it was further held that before the Act of
1878 this agreement of the grantee was not required to be in
writing.6?
After the passage of the Act, as between the mortgagorgrantor and the grantee, it has been held that the Act applies
only to the relations between the grantee and the holder of
the encumbrance, and does not affect the liability of the
grantee to the grantor nor change the import of the words
"under and subject to" as between them ;68 also that the Act
does not require the grantee's covenant to indemnify the
6

4Merriman vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78: Beattie's Estate, I D. & C. 679.
65Lennim's Estate. 52 Pa. 125.
6
6Merriman vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa. 200.
6
7Merriman vs. Moore, 90 Pa. 78; Donahue's Estate, 29 Dist. 448.
6SBlood vs. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. 334; May's Estate, 218 Pa.
64: Greenspau vs. Margolls, 70 Super. 373.
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grantor to be expressly assumed in writing;s that an implied
covenant of indemnity is created by the use of the word-,

"under and subject to," 70 and an express covenant of indemnity is created by the woras "agrees and assumes to pay." 71
It has also been held that the words "under and subject to"
create a covenant of indemnity against loss by reason of liability, and that where the covenant is thus created, the grantee is not liable to the grantor until the latter has actually
paid a judgment in favor of the mortgagee upon the debt,
the mere entry of which against the grantor does not permit
him to sue the grantee.7 2 On the other hand, a covenant of
indemnity, created by 'agrees and assumes to pay," is a
covenant against liability 73 and the grantee is liable to the
grantor thereunder immediately upon entry of judgment by
the mortgagee against the grantor, although the judgment has
not been paid.7 '
In a statement, obiter dictum, the court once said that
the covenant created by the words "under and subject to"
imposes liability upon 'the grantee to indemnify the grantor
only to the extent of the value of the land,75 but this .was
expressly overruled later, the court holding that the grantee's liability under the covenant thus created is not simply
de terris, but co-extensive with the loss actually suffered by
the grantor in paying the mortgage debt.7
69Blood vs. Crew L.evick Co., supra, note 68. As to the obligation
of a contract vendee to indemnify his vendor, see Dobkin vs. Landsberg, 273 Pa. 174, 180; Schotte vs. Meredith, 197 Pa. 496.
7OBlood vs. Crew Levick Co., supra, note 68. This was denied in
Kirker vs. Wylie, 207 Pa. 511, the court saying that the Act changed
the previous lay that "under and subject to" created a covenant of
indemnity, since the Act relieved the grantee from any liability arising from "under and subject to." This statement, dictum, was overruled in the cases cited in note 71.
7lFaulkner vs. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298, and cases cited in note 68.
72Faulkner vs. McHenry, supra, note 71; May's Estate, 218 Pa.
64; Blood vs. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. 334.
73Faulkner vs. McHenry, 235 Pa. 298.
74M Abee vs. Cribbs, 194 Pa. 94.
75Blood vs. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. 334.
76May's Estate, 218 Pa. 64.
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In Kirker vs. Wylie,7 the defendant, as grantee, had
"assumed and agreed to pay" the mortgage debt and had
later conveyed the land. Thereafter the plaintiff, the grantor of the defendant, was compelled to pay part of the debt
and sued the defendant on his covenant of indemnity. The
court held that since payment of the mortgage was assumed as
part of the consideration for the conveyance to him, the defendant's covenant of indemnity continued after his conveyance in spite of Sec. 2 of the Act of 1878, since it was as
much a continuing liability as an obligation to pay a fixed sum
and could be discharged only by payment. There has been
no decision on the moot question whether a grantee's covenant of indemnity, created by "under and subject to,"
would survive his conveyance to another.
The Act of 1878 has, however, materially affected the
liability of the grantee to the mortgagee. Where a grantee
takes "under and subject to" the mortgage, the use of these
words does' not impose upon him any personal liability to
the mortgagee. This was so before the Act7 s and is now true
by the express provision of the Act itself.79 As pointed out
above, if the grantee in substance "assumed and agreed to
pay" the mortgage debt, he was, prior to the Act, personaI3,
liable to the mortgagee, even though his undertaking was not
in writing. The Act now makes it clear that there shall be
no personal liability to the mortgagee unless the grantee assumes it in writing. Suppose, then, that in the conveyance
to him, the grantee "assumes and agrees to pay" the mortgage debt. Does this satisfy the statute and permit the
0
mortgagee to sue the grantee? It has been intimated and
s
decided ' that under such circumstances the mortgagee cannot sue the grantee, because although the grantee assumes
a personal liability, it inures, under Sec. 2 of the Act, to the
77207 'Pa. 511.
78
See supra, note 65.
79
FIsler vs. Reach, 202 Pa. 74.
8OSloan vs. Klein, 230 Pa. 132.
SITritten's Estate, 238 Pa. 555.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

grantor only with whom the agreement was made. But the
recent case of Lowery vs. Hensal's Heirs12 very clearly decides the contrary. The court said:"' "There is no doubt
in this Commonwealth, that in an assumption and agreement to pay, the mortgagee has a direct action against the
grantee." 4
It has also been held that the grantee cannot escape his
personal liability to the mortgagee, created by the words "as
sumes and agrees to pay," on the ground that the mortgagee
gave no consideration for the mortgage. 85 If the grantee,
who thus assumes a personal liability to the mortgagee, is a
corporation, the obligation is not an indebtedness up on which,
under the Act of 1885, P. L. 193, the corporation is requirt.,
to assess and collect a tax. 6 Where a grantee is personally
liable to the mortgagee because he has "assumed and agreed
to pay," that personal liability cannot be enforced against
him by the mortgagee after he has conveyed the premises
to another, since under Sec. 2 of the Act of 18718, such personal liability to the mortgagee will survive the grantee's
conveyance only when he expressly assumes such continuing
liability.

7

But as pointed out above, 89 a grantee who thus

conveys is still liable to his grantor under his covenant of
indemnity.
SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
The question discussed in this article is the right of
a third person to sue on a contract made for his benefit.
There are several interesting collateral or subsidiary ques82281 Pa. 572; see also Gill's Estate, 268 Pa. 500, -where the court
held that the same rule applies as between the holder of an encumbrance and the buyer of personal property, but that the promise of
the buyer need not be in writing, since the Act of 1878 does not apply
to sales of personal property.
83At page 578.
s4See
also Old Colony Trust Co., vs. Transit Co., 192 Pa. 596, 618.
85
Supra, note 84.
8SCommonwealth vs. Dupont Land Co., 254 Pa. 446.
7
s8 Sloan vs. Klein, 230 Pa. 132; compare Krker vs. Wylie, supra,

note 77.
8

s See note 77 and text.
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tions which may arise in cases where the third person is
permitted to sue: Can the promisee also sue the promisor?
Will the release of the promisor by the promisee bar the
third person's action? 9" In an action by the third person
against the promisor, can the latter successfully interpose defenses good against the promisee, or defenses which the
promisee might use against the third person, when the latter
is a creditor of the promisee? 1
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania decisions on the
right of a third person to sue on a contract made for his
benefit justify the following conclusions:
1. A donee-beneficiary has always been permitted to
sue on a contract made for his benefit. 2
2. Prior to Brill vs. Brill, a creditor-beneficiary was
permitted to sue under the principles laid down in Adams vs.
Kuehn, which apparently limited the right of a creditorbeneficiary to sue to a contract which created a trust in his
favor. But in following Adams vs. Kuehn, later decisions
have gone beyond trusts properly so-called and permitted the
creditor-beneficiary to sue when the consideration for tht
promise was money or property placed in the hands of the
promisor, although the latter was under no duty to use the
property received or its proceeds in the performance of his
promise. Under this theory, creditor-beneficiaries have been
permitted to sue in the following cases:
a. Where the promisee delivers money or property to
the promisor to be used by the latter in paying the promisee's debts.93
b. Where the promisee transfers or sells his business,
property, etc., to the promisor who, as part of the consider9OThat It will not, see Brill vs. Brill,
9For answers to these questions, see
secs. 296-298; 1 Williston on Contracts,
92There are but one or two decisions
93This approaches the trust theory.

282 Pa. 276.
Corbin's Anson on Contract,
secs. 390-399.
to the contrary, See note 50.
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ation therefor, promises to pay the debts of his vendor or
transferor.
c. A mortgagee of premises may sue a grantee who
"assumes and agrees to pay" the mortgage debt provided
there has been compliance with the Act of 1878, discussed
above.
3. According to the recent case of Brill vs. Brill, a
third person, whether he is a donee or creditor-beneficiary,
may sue on a contract to which he is not a party where it
appears that the contract was made for the primary purpose of benefiting him.
FRED S. REESE
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MOOT COURT
WALLACE VS. MACALISTER
Negligence-Imputation

of Negligence--Unauthorized Use of Auto-

mobile--Liability of Owner-Contributory Negligence
As a Defense-75 Super. 334 Approved
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trespass for damages to Wallace's automobile by defendant's automobile colliding with it. Plaintiff's automobile was being run by
X, who had been directed by Wallace to take it to his garage. Instead of doing so directly, X picked up a friend and carried him a
mile, and then returned to the point at which he had picked the
It was while going with
friend up, and thence to the garage.
the friend that the collision occured. Maclister was negligent, X
was also negligent, and the accident was caused by the concurrent
negligence of the two. The court said X's negligence would not impair the right of Wallace to compensation from the defendant.
Roemer. for Plaintiff.
Reiter, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mitchell, J. This is an action by the plaintiff to recover damages sustained to his auto while being driven by X beyond the
scope of his employment or authority.
We do not think, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the important question is one of principal and agent, master and servant,
or bailor and bailee, although these are incidental to our examination.
We believe the pertinent question for the court is when did X digress from his path and when he deviated was he acting within the
scope of his authority or employment, either expressedly, impliedly,
ostensibly or bv ratification.
In order to determine the above let us examine the acts of X
and the plaintiff. The plaintiff gave an explicit and peremptory
order that X was to drive his car to the garage. In the discharge of
this duty X met a friend, whom he picked up as a passenger and drove
a mile off his course and returned to the point where he had devi-
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ated; in digressing he disobeyed orders and was liable for the consequences that might arise from this act of disobedience.
We do not feel that the defendant has discovered the true question when he takes exception to the Instruction of the court. It is
true that it is the province of the jury to decide facts, but this was
complied with, for the Instruction of the court was one of law and
points out the one who would be liable if they found certain facts.
Maloy vs. Rosenbaum, 260 Pa. 466, cited by the defendant, sustains
the view of the plaintiff and court in that where'an employee acts
beyon4 the scope of his authority the employer may recover for
damages he has sustained by the wrongful acts of the employee.
Goate vs. Koltz, 279 Pa. 392, cited by the plaintiff, is one of
the latest decisions on this point. This case holds that because a
person has acted beyond the scope of his authority does not prevent
the employer from recovering. The burden of proof, as in the above
case, will fall upon the defendant to prove that the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment or authority.
This question has been widely discussed and often adjudicated
by courts of Pennsylvania, and in support of the foregoing we cite,
263 Pa. 271, 262 Pa. 436, 275 Pa. 246, 252 Pa. 451, In addition to the
authorities cited by the plaintiff in his brief.
Therefore, in conclusion, we find that X was acting beyond the
scope of his authority and regardless of whether or not he was acting in any one of the hereifnbefore named capacities, the plaintiff
may recover damages sustained while the machine was being driven
beyond his authority or employment.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
If the negligent act of X occured while he was in the service of his
employer, doing an act required by that service, his act would be
deemed, so far as the liability of Macalister Is concerned, as the act
of Wallace himself, and no recovery of damages could be possible by
Wallace. Faust vs. Railway Co., 191 Pa. 420.
If X was not acting for his employer when the accident occured,
his negligence would not be imputable to his employer, who could
recover full compensation from the defendant, despite the concurrence of X's act with that of the defendant, in the production of the
injury.
In such a case either of the negligent contributors to the Injury
would be liable to make full compensation, and neither, In paying
damages, could enforce contribution from the other.
We approve of the disposition made of this case by the learned
court below. Cf. Walker vs. Quaker City Cab Co., 75 Super. 334.
The judgment is affirmed.
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WINGATE VS. McFEE
Contracts--Modifications

by Parole Evidence-Sufficiency

of Evi-

dence Necessary to Vary Written Contract-75 Super. 340
and 254 Pa. 585 Cited.
STATE

ENT OF FACTS

A written contract was made by McFee with Wingate whereby
Wingate was to find a purchaser of a house belonging to McFee at
$5000, and Wingate was to be paid $300. A purchaser able and willing to pay $5000 was procured by Wingate but McFee declined to
make the sale because his wife objected, and refused to pay the commission. The contract did not condition Wingate's right to the commission on the completion of the sale. Wingate denied that there
was an oral provision for such completion. McFee's testimony that
there was, was not supported by other witnesses or by circumstances. Effect Is given by the court to the unchanged, unreformed writing. Judgment for $300.
Sheely, for Plaintiff.
Templeton, for Defendant.
-

OPINION OF THE COURT

Vaxmonsky, J. The writing upon which this action is brought
contains a promise on the part of the defendant only. It recites perfectly and in specific terms, the agreement to be performed on the
part of the plaintiff as the consideration upon which the promise
of the defendant is made. The declaration also alleges the full performance of the condition by the plaintiff, and the defendant's refusal to pay the stipulated sum due. The answer alleges that the
sum which the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff, is not in consideration of the plaintiff's promise to find the purchaser, but upon an
oral agreement between themselves to pay the stipulated amount upon the completion of the sale.
The first question therefore to be decided in this case is whether
there was a valid, binding contract. Reviewing and considering the
facts closely, we are of the opinion that there was a valid contract.
It was an offer of a promise for an act, which constituted a unilateral
contract. The defendant promised to pay the plaintiff $300, if he,
the plaintiff, would find a purchaser, who was willing to buy the saL.
property. The plaintiff found the purchaser according to the contract and has performed his part of the said contract. It has been
decided in Phillips vs. Allegheny Car Co., 82 Pa. 368, and in Hoffman vs. Bloomsburg, 157 Pa. 174, "That an-offer proposing a unil-
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ateral contract becomes a binding promise immediately upon the performance of the act requested to be done." In 25 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1173, the court held that if the promisor has recei ed a consideration
his promise is binding, and may be aptly termed an obligation, but
since there is no promise on the part of the promisee, there can be
no mutual obligation. Accordingly, where one makes a promise
conditioned upon the doing of the act by another and the later does
the act, the contract is not void, for the want of mutuality, but the
promisor is liable although the promisee did not at the time of the
promise agree to do the act, for upon the performance of the act b,
the promisee the contract becomes clothed with a valid consideration
which relates back and renders the promise obligatory. Applying
these two principles of law to the facts of this case, we can readily
see that the defendant has received some consideration for his promise, and therefore he is bound by the terms of the contract.
Having determined that there is a valid contract the next question to be considered is, can parole evidence be introduced for the
purpose of varying the terms of the contract, which are clear, precise and indubitable- The general rule, we take to be, is, that where
the words of any instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves and
where external circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty
as to the proper application of those words to the subject matter to
which the instrument relates, such instrument is always to be construed according to the strict, plain, and common meaning of the
words themselves. In such a case, evidence dehors the instrument,
for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmise or alleged
intention of the parties to the instrument, is inadmissible. If it were
otherwise no lawyer would be safe in advising upon the construction
of a written instrument, nor any party in taking or performing some
act under it, for the ablest advice might be controlled and the clearest title undermined, if at some future period parol evidence of a particular meaning which the party affixes to his words or of his secret
intention in making the instrument were allowed.
Henry in Pa. Trial Evidence, Sect. 395, says, "Where parties have
put their agreement into writing, such writing is not only the best
evidence, but the only evidence of it." And in Hallowell vs. Bright,
6 Sch. L. R. 388, it has been held that when a contract is In writing it
cannot be varied or changed by the testimony of the defendant who
is bound by It.
Presuming that at the time the defendant and plaintiff entered
into the written agreement, they contemporaneously and orally agreed
to a different consideration than that stated in the contract, can
that fact be introduced into evidence? We are of the opinion that
such evidence cannot be introduced, for to permit it, would permit all
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parties, who had made such contracts, to contradict the terms of a
written contract, and thereby be benefitted by it, thus depriving the
innocent party of his right to be compensated for the compliance of
the alleged agreement. Had it been supported by the testimony of
some witness, or by corroborating circumstances, we would say that
parole evidence could be given in evidence to contradict and vary
the terms of a written contract. Since the facts of this case show
explicitly that this was not done, we are of the opinion that the court
was justified in giving effect to the unchanged, unreformed writing.
It has been decided, that where a contract has been reduced to writing, it is understood as expressing the final conclusion of the contracting parties and fully accepted as merging all parol negotiation and
understanding, whether agreeing or inconsistent with the written one.
To contradict the terms of a written contract, by an oral contemporaneous agreement between parties, there must be an allegation, as
well as proof, not of the contract but its omission, through fraud,
accident, or mistake to state the real intention of the parties. Vito
vs. Biskell, 208 Pa. 206; Yargan vs. Glick, 180 Pa. 480; Wood vs. Robman, 148 Pa. 573; Hunter vs. McHose, 100 Pa. 38.
And to reform an instrument or to modify it, it must be supported by the testimony of another witness or by corroborating circumstances. Kline vs. Fitzgerald, 267 Pa. 489; Murra v vs. Railroad, 103
Pa. 37; Dixon vs. Minague, 276 Pa- 562; Rowand vs. Finney, 96 Pa.
192.
In Keller vs. Cohen, 217 Pa. 522, and in Ridway Dynamo & Engine Co. vs. Pennsylvania Cement Co., 221 Pa. 660, the court held
that a contemporaneous oral agreement alleged to have been made
at the time of the execution of the original, cannot be shown where
such oral agreement is Inconsistent with the terms of a written contract.
In view of the above stated authorities, we hold that since McFee's testimony was not supported by other witnesses or by other
oircumstances, the lower court was justified In giving effect only to
the unreformed, unchanged writing, and therefore the judgment of
the lower court Is affirmed.
OPINION

OF SUPREME

COURT

According to the writing, the plaintiff was to find a person Willing to pay $5000 for the house. His right to compensation was not
suspended on the willingness of the defendant to make the conveyance
to the person found willing to buy. The learned court below has
clearly shown that the plaintiff's right is not dependent on the conclusion of the conveyance.
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The defendant seeks to change the contract from what, by the
writing, It is, to a contract to pay $300 if the buyer being found, an
actual conveyance is made to him. This is a material change from
the contract expressed by the writing. Only one witness proved the
parol understanding. Nor were there corroborating circumstances.
One witness, the plaintiff, equally credable with the defendant, contradicts him. To reject the written evidence of the contract under
such circumstances would be arbitrary, unreasonable, and indicative
of a wrong bias against the plaintiff. The rights of contracting
parties have a very precarious foundation if, after a writing has been
resorted to, to express and testify to the agreement, one of them can
destroy the obligation expressed in the instrument, which is likewise
sustained by the testimony of the other party to the transaction. The
learned court below is fully supported by Rill vs., Smith, 75 Super.
340; and Thompson vs. Schoch, 254 Pa. 585, besides the cases cited by
it.
The judgment is affirmed.
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